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A number of gaps divide reality from perception concerning the ki-
netic energy ballistic missile defense and antisatellite (ASAT)
weapons developed, tested, and possessed by the United States and
China. This article explains the equivalence of these supposedly dis-
tinct classes of weaponry, and reviews the diplomatic history sur-
rounding recent Chinese and US tests of them, particularly in the
light of recent WikiLeaks revelations. The inadequacy of arms-con-
trol proposals that would address only the testing or use of these
weapons as ASATs is discussed, and a more substantive proposal is
offered that emerged in a recent meeting between Chinese and US
arms-control analysts. KEYWORDS: antisatellite weapons, arms con-
trol, ballistic missile defense, Chinese military, WikiLeaks.
WHEN CHINA CAUSED THE INTENTIONAL COLLISION OF TWO OBJECTS IN
outer space on January 11, 2007, its “experiment”—unambiguously
a test of an antisatellite (ASAT) weapon—was widely condemned as
provocative and irresponsible. The target, the seven-year-old weather
satellite FY-1C, had been stationed in a nearly circular orbit at an al-
titude of 860 km, and most of the debris from the collision continued
along trajectories near that of the satellite. This debris remained in
low-Earth orbit (LEO) at altitudes concentrated between 500 and
1,500 km but ranging as low as 200 and as high as 4,000 km. It spread
out to fill, and to pose a threat to satellites orbiting anywhere within
the entire LEO sphere.1 By 2010 NASA reported that 2,841 pieces of
this debris had been cataloged, 97 percent of which remained in orbit.
As many as 35,000 more pieces were too small to be observed from
Earth. The FY-1C debris accounted for “about 18% of the entire pop-
ulation of cataloged man-made objects in orbit” and was “the great-
est amount of orbital debris” ever produced in a single event, more
than twice that left by the accidental Cosmos-Iridium satellite colli-
sion two years later (NASA 2010).
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The test was not announced by China, and news of it only sur-
faced a week later, leaked from US sources (Covault 2007). The in-
formation was confirmed by a US spokesman the next day, and the
following day “protests and expressions of concern were lodged over
the test by the United States, Japan, Canada, South Korea and Aus-
tralia,” later joined by Britain, Taiwan, India, South Korea, and the
European Union (Elegant and Thompson 2007; Hitchens 2007). The
United States had in fact protested to China in Beijing and Washing-
ton on January 15 (WikiLeaks 2011d). However, the Chinese min-
istry of foreign affairs did not acknowledge that the test had taken
place until January 23 (Yu 2007). Earlier, its spokesman had stated
that the ministry “had not been informed” (DPA 2007). As Gregory
Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis comment, “China’s failure to present a
timely, cogent explanation to the world magnified the test’s negative
consequences by making the Chinese government appear careless,
indifferent, and disorganized” (2008, 338).
Exactly three years later, China conducted a second collision test
of a similar, identical, or improved version of the same weapon. Much
of what we know about this is contained in a January 12, 2010, US
State Department cable released by WikiLeaks (WikiLeaks 2011b).2
According to that document, the target was a CSS-X-11 ballistic mis-
sile (BM) launched from the Shuangchengzi Space and Missile Cen-
ter.3 The interceptor was carried by an SC-19 rocket launched from
the Korla Missile Test Complex, two minutes and forty-two seconds
later.4 The collision took place at an altitude of 250 km, about five min-
utes after the launch of the interceptor. In the second test, both objects
were traveling on BM-like trajectories, and would have fallen to Earth
soon in the absence of a collision. After the impact, which also took
place at a relatively low altitude, debris pieces followed trajectories
close to those of the objects from which they were created, and there-
fore quickly reentered Earth’s atmosphere. As the State Department
cable noted (one day later), “No debris from this test remains on-orbit.”
This time, China was much better prepared for any foreign reac-
tion, and instead of taking two weeks to acknowledge the test, an-
nounced it promptly through the official news agency Xinhua,
reporting that “the test has achieved the expected objective” (Xinhua
2010). Given the lack of hazardous debris created by the second col-
lision test, international reaction was comparatively muted. But there
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was good reason to doubt Xinhua’s assertion that “the test is defen-
sive in nature and is not targeted at any country.”Although the second
collision test was called by China “a test on ground-based midcourse
missile interception technology,” information gained about the per-
formance of the weapon would be completely applicable to its use
against a satellite.
As this article shows, ballistic missile defense (BMD) weapons of
the type first developed by the United States, and tested by China in
January 2010, are so closely related to kinetic energy antisatellite
(KE-ASAT) weapons that the two are in many cases indistinguish-
able. Although tests against satellites and against missile targets are
distinguishable by definition, this distinction has little or no technical
significance for the weapons involved, and testing against one type of
target can fully satisfy requirements for development and validation
of weapons for use against either type of target. This is a fact that
must be taken into account when considering the implications of any
such testing and when proposing any arms control measures intended
to prevent a space arms race.
Doublethink, Doubletalk
One would think the United States could hardly object to China con-
ducting such a test, since the United States itself has carried out many
such tests, beginning with the Homing Overlay Experiment in 1984.
Moreover, the United States has developed and operationally de-
ployed several weapons systems with similar capabilities, including
the Theater HighAltitudeAir Defense (THAAD), the Ground-Based
Midcourse Defense (GMD), and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) (Samson 2010). These systems have been
tested against targets in space at least four dozen times since 1999.5
Nonetheless, on January 12, 2010, the US embassy in Beijing
was sent an “action request” to demarche the Chinese ministry of for-
eign affairs on US concerns about the second Chinese test. The cable
explained, as background, that
an SC-19 was used previously as the payload booster for the Janu-
ary 11, 2007, direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) intercept of
Mark A. Gubrud 619
the Chinese FY-1C weather satellite. Previous SC-19 DA-ASAT
flight-tests were conducted in 2005 and 2006. This test is assessed
to have furthered both Chinese ASAT and ballistic missile defense
(BMD) technologies. (S//NF) Due to the sensitivity of the intelli-
gence that would have to be disclosed to substantiate the U.S. as-
sessment, the U.S. Government in its demarche to the PRC
Government will not associate the January 2010 SC-19 intercept
flight-test with past SC-19ASAT flight-tests. The United States will
request assistance from ourAsia-Pacific alliesAustralia, Japan, and
the Republic of Korea in demarching China in a fashion similar to
the U.S. approach. (WikiLeaks 2011b; emphasis added)6
The reader may judge whether the intent was to elide the issue of US
testing of equivalent weapons with both BMD and ASAT capabili-
ties, or whether in fact sensitive intelligence is required to discern the
applicability of BMD technology to anASAT program. In either case,
the inclusion of the marker “S//NF” (secret, not releasable to foreign
nationals) indicates that the Obama administration really did not want
this issue discussed publicly, in diplomatic exchanges with China, or
even with the “allies” to be enlisted in “demarching China in a fash-
ion similar to the U.S. approach.”
As outlined in the cable, the US approach to demarching China
consisted of questions about the “direction of China’s BMD pro-
gram.” Did China view missile defense as contributing to deterrence
and stability? Whose missiles was the program intended to defend
against? Since China would obviously not want to give straight an-
swers to these questions, the questions suggest skepticism that the test
was in fact part of a BMD program.7 The US diplomats were also to
ask, “What steps were taken to minimize the creation of orbital de-
bris?” This question is clearly disingenuous, since the obvious an-
swer is that they tested it against a ballistic missile, at low altitude,
instead of a satellite. However, if “asked about the Obama Adminis-
tration’s position regarding China’s earlier direct-ascent anti-satellite
flight-test,” US diplomats were to reply that US concerns about the
earlier test were still valid, and that “the United States has steadfastly
urged China not to conduct further anti-satellite weapons flight-test-
ing in space.”
US concerns expressed to China in January 2007 were not limited
to debris. They included the objection that the test of an ASAT “did
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not square with China’s stated position of not wishing to embark on
any kind of arms race in outer space.” This is revealed in a cable dated
January 6, 2008, in which Washington instructed its diplomats in
“Berlin, Canberra, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Seoul, TelAviv, and
Tokyo” to ask those governments to relay another message to China,
complaining again about the debris but going further to emphasize
that
• The United States considers space systems to have the rights of
unhindered passage through, and operations in, space without
interference.
• Any purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be in-
terpreted by the United States as an infringement of its rights
and considered an escalation in a crisis or conflict.
• The United States reserves the right, consistent with the UN
Charter and international law, to defend and protect its space
systems with a wide range of options, from diplomatic to mili-
tary (WikiLeaks 2011c).
The overtly threatening tone of this message may have been in-
tended to have an effect both on China and on the allied governments.
The United States wanted allies to seek answers to questions about
China’s ASAT program: Would there be “further tests of a direct-
ascent antisatellite weapon or other antisatellite weapons, capabili-
ties, or technologies? Would any of these be operationally deployed?
If the US allies asked about US rejection of the Russian-Chinese pro-
posal of a Treaty on Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space, they were to be urged not to support that initiative. It was to
be pointed out to them that “the draft treaty would not prohibit the
development and deployment of a ground-based direct-ascent inter-
ceptor of the type of ASAT China tested last year.” No answer was
specified to any questions about why the United States had not re-
sponded by proposing a more comprehensive space arms-control
agreement.Allies were to be told that “the United States does not have
any ‘weapons’ in space, nor do we have any plans to field such
weapons.” If allies asked about US missile defense, they were to be
told, “The U.S. missile defense system is strictly a defensive system.”
The last claim was true, unless, of course, the US missile defense
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system were to be used in an offensive role, such as to destroy a satel-
lite. Perhaps the most hypocritical assertion to be conveyed to allies
was that “the United States has not conducted an antisatellite test since
1985.” The 1985 test of the F-15–launched Miniature Homing Vehi-
cle was indeed the only time in history that the United States had in-
tentionally destroyed a satellite in orbit. But even as this
demarche-through-allies was being launched at China, the United
States was already preparing for its second “satellite shootdown.”
Proven but Denied: BMD and ASAT Weapons
The US Satellite Intercept of 2008 and China’s Reaction
On February 21, 2008, the United States used a ship-launched SM-3
missile to intercept an intelligence satellite known as NROL-21, or
USA-193, which had suffered an apparent failure of all systems after
launch. The plan to intercept the satellite was not announced publicly
until just six days before the shot, although news had been leaked a
few days earlier (Fulghum 2008). This gave foreign and domestic op-
ponents little time to voice any objections. The target was in a de-
caying orbit, nearing reentry, and the collision took place at an altitude
of 247 km (close to that chosen by the Chinese, perhaps not coinci-
dentally, for their second intercept test two years later) (US Depart-
ment of Defense 2008). At such low altitude, even if the target is on
an orbital trajectory, the debris particles, with much lower ballistic
coefficients (ratio of mass to aerodynamic drag) than an intact satel-
lite, almost immediately reenter the atmosphere.
Although the stated justification for the intercept was to destroy
the satellite’s fuel tank, filled with half a ton of frozen hydrazine,
there were many reasons to doubt this rationale. The tank would un-
doubtedly have ruptured and the hydrazine burned on reentry.8 Even
if some of the hydrazine had made it to the ground, its toxicity is
similar to that of ammonia, and the acrid smell, on top of the crash
and likely fire, would probably have sent survivors fleeing. If one
makes a cautious estimate that whatever was left of the tank and hy-
drazine ice ball would kill anyone found within a seven-meter radius
of its impact point, its chance of killing at least one person was
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about one in a thousand.9 The intercept operation was publicly pro-
jected to cost the US government $40–$60 million, but final costs
were reported at $112 million (McIntyre 2008; InsideDefense.com
2008). Thus, although US officials insisted the purpose of the shot
was to save human life, the cost per life saved was extraordinarily
high, and the overwhelming probability is that no life would have
been lost if the satellite had been allowed to make an uncontrolled
reentry.
If the USA-193 antisatellite operation is inadequately explained
by a concern for human safety, what it certainly did accomplish was
to underscore US threats to “defend and protect its space systems with
a wide range of options” by demonstrating that the United States
could still do what it had done in 1985—and what China had only
done in 2007.10 Moreover, it showed that the United States possessed
that capability in the form of highly developed, tested, and opera-
tionally deployed weapons systems.
Chinese reactions to the intercept showed a keen understanding
of its implications. China was only informed of US intentions on Feb-
ruary 15 in a demarche which, incredibly, warned “that China should
not use the U.S. satellite-interception event as an excuse to conduct
further anti-satellite tests” (WikiLeaks 2011a). In a February 21 press
briefing, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Liu Jianchao said
that “China is continuing to closely follow the possible harm caused
by the U.S. action to outer space security and relevant countries”
(Xinhua 2008; emphasis added). According to another leaked US
cable,
several academics say that much of the PRC public and official re-
sponse to the event is driven by their anger over the berating the
PRC received after their January 2007 ASAT test. . . . [However,]
Dr. Teng Jianqun, Deputy Secretary General of the China Arms
Control and Disarmament Department, took a different point of
view, instead citing the U.S. “rejection” of the 12 February joint
PRC-Russian proposal for a treaty banning weapons in space as the
incendiary driving PRC anger. “This shoot-down proves the U.S.
missile defense system is also an offensive system,” he said. . . .
Dr. Teng described the shoot-down as unnecessary and simply an
opportunity to test the U.S. missile defense system. (WikiLeaks
2011c)
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Questionable US Explanations
Despite numerous reports that the SM-3 missile was “modified” and
would not normally have been able to engage a satellite, General
James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated
after the shot that the only physical modification to the missile had
been for purposes of telemetry—that is, not to enable the intercept
but only to collect data about it (Cartwright 2008). The mission was
modeled and gamed to ensure the highest likelihood of success, and
“software” was reportedly changed, but it is very unlikely that this
refers to anything but data tables for optimized target recognition, aim
point, and intercept geometry selection. Changes to the real-time soft-
ware that controls the missile’s various systems would be risky, and
there is no reason to think that any such changes would be necessary.
The fire control system was also networked to remote sensors that
provided cuing and target tracking data, so that launch of the missile
did not need to depend solely on the ship’s onboard radar. This capa-
bility was not previously a feature of the Aegis Ballistic Missile De-
fense System, but as of 2011 it is being permanently incorporated as
“launch on remote” (Brinton 2011; O’Reilly 2011; “Sea-based Mis-
sile Defense Flight Test” 2011).
US denials that the SM-3 represents an operationalASATweapon
are not entirely unfounded. The missile in its Block IA and more re-
cent IB versions is believed to have a fairly low burnout speed, about
3 km/s, and is therefore unable to engage satellites at altitudes higher
than about 400 km. Although a few militarily significant satellites
may be within its range, the bulk of important targets are found at
higher altitudes. However, the follow-on SM-3 Block IIA and IIB ver-
sions, slated to be introduced in 2015–2020, would have a larger
booster and higher burnout speed, ostensibly to enable them to en-
gage longer-range BMs but also giving them the ability to intercept a
large majority of satellites in low-Earth orbit (Grego andWright 2010,
22). As a sea-based system, the SM-3s could potentially be dispersed
around the globe to enable a prompt sky-sweeping strike.
Meanwhile, the several dozen interceptors (thirty as of 2011) of
the GMD system have burnout speed reported in the range of 5.5–6
km/s, and hence pose a threat to essentially all LEO satellites (up to
altitudes of 1,500–2,000 km) (Missile Defense Agency 2011; Clare-
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mont Institutes undated). The Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projec-
tile (LEAP) warhead used in the SM-3 and the somewhat larger
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) used in the Ground-Based In-
terceptor (GBI) are essentially the same technology, and both are
made by Raytheon Corporation. There is no reason to doubt that the
GMD/GBI can intercept satellites within its range if it can intercept
missiles.
In fact, BMD is usually considered the harder mission. One re-
tired Chinese general commented that “satellite interception is like
shooting a beer bottle. Missile interception is like shooting ducks”
(Chen 2010). According to the report in which he was quoted, this is
because “the defence system had to identify the location and trajec-
tory of the missile. Because of the speed of the warhead, the time for
response including detection, aim and launch was a matter of min-
utes.” That is a fair statement of some of the problems an operational
BMD system faces, as compared with anASATweapon, which might
be pretargeted on a satellite known to follow a predictable trajectory.
But of course, China’s 2010 test may not have been operationally re-
alistic; US BMD tests usually are not.
More significant is the fact that BMs, and especially their sepa-
rated warheads, present smaller and less observable targets than most
satellites of interest. Hitting them therefore imposes greater demands
on the sensitivity and resolution of homing sensors and the precision
and speed of terminal guidance and divert thrusters. Consider that a
closing speed of 10 km/s implies that 1 second prior to impact, the tar-
get is still 10 km away. If the aim of the interceptor is off by 30 cm,
it may completely miss a BM or warhead, whereas the larger cross-
section of a satellite presents a more forgiving target. In addition,
given constraints on interceptor basing and the narrow window for
destruction of a ballistic missile before it reaches its target, the BMD
mission may require a high closing speed, whereasASAT strike plan-
ning may provide more opportunities for choosing intercept geome-
tries that moderate closing speeds.11
It may be unlikely that the United States would ever use its hit-
to-kill kinetic energy BMD (KE-BMD) systems as debris-creating ki-
netic energyASAT (KE-ASAT) weapons. But the capability is there,
and it is difficult to be sure what the United States would consider
doing when facing the prospect of a hot war with a nuclear-armed na-
Mark A. Gubrud 625
tion. In particular, Chinese photoreconnaissance, radar, and signals
intelligence satellites might enable the targeting of anti-ship ballistic
missiles (ASBM) or other weapons on the US fleet in the event of a
crisis in the Western Pacific. Although the United States may have
other means of addressing this threat, one of the fastest and surest
ways to disable a LEO satellite is with a KE ASAT. It is also fair to
ask how US military analysts would view Chinese possession of an
ASAT-capable arsenal comparable to the existing GMDs plus planned
Block II SM-3s.
BMD Testing and ASAT Testing
Not only can BMD weapons be used to destroy satellites, but testing
against targets in ballistic missile–like trajectories can fully support
the needs of a program intended to develop and perfect these weapons
for use in ASAT missions.
A number of misconceptions lead to confusion about this point.
For example, it is sometimes said that ballistic missiles fly on para-
bolic trajectories, but in fact both BMs and satellites travel on ellip-
tical trajectories after booster burnout. Therefore, the implication that
different algorithms would be needed to predict the motion of each
class of target is false. In fact, in the endgame just before the intercept,
both the interceptor and the missile or satellite will be in freefall, apart
from the interceptor’s small corrections to its course. This means that
the interceptor can almost completely ignore gravity in the crucial
final seconds since it affects target and interceptor equally.
Satellites may travel faster than ballistic missiles, which would
seem to make them harder targets. The horizontal velocity of a satel-
lite in circular orbit at 500 km altitude is 7.6 km/s in the Earth frame
of reference—that is, relative to the Earth’s center—whereas for long-
range ballistic missiles it will be in the range of 3–7 km/s. However,
KE-BMD/ASAT interceptors may close on their targets in a wide
range of geometries, as viewed in the Earth frame. They may appear,
in the Earth frame, to make a head-on collision, in which case the
closing speed is the sum of interceptor and target Earth-frame speeds.
Alternatively, one object (possibly the target) may appear to overtake
the other, as both travel in the same horizontal direction. In this case,
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the closing speed is the difference of the two Earth-frame speeds. Be-
tween these two limiting cases, the objects may appear to collide at
any angle.
I use the word “appear” here because this is just how the geom-
etry of the intercept appears in some frame of reference, such as that
of the Earth’s center, or that of some point on the Earth’s surface.
From the point of view of each object, the other object comes straight
at it, at some closing speed that is the (magnitude of the) difference
of the two objects’ vector velocities. In this sense, all collisions in
space are always head-on. The interceptor orients itself so that its
axial homing sensor (telescope) is pointed directly at its target. Which
aspect of the target is impacted depends on the target’s orientation,
which may affect the interceptor’s chance of success, since the shape,
cross-sectional area, shading, and reflectivity of the target may vary
with its orientation.
Thus, by choice of the intercept geometry, the closing speed can
often be reduced, or alternatively the aspect of the target to be im-
pacted can be chosen in order to increase the chance of a successful
intercept. The ASAT mission will generally allow more flexibility to
choose a favorable geometry than is the case for BMD, where for
given missile and interceptor launch points the missile must be inter-
cepted before reaching its target.
The ASAT mission can be formally distinguished from BMD by
definition: A satellite is an object in an orbital trajectory, that is, a
state of inertial motion such that, with gravity the only significant ex-
ternal force acting upon it, the object will complete at least one rev-
olution around the Earth. However, for LEO—that is, altitudes below
about 2,000 km—this state of motion constitutes a narrow band of
the parameter space consisting of altitude and horizontal and vertical
components of Earth-frame velocity. From the point of view of hitting
the object with a homing interceptor at some high closing speed, it
matters little whether the object resides inside or outside that narrow
orbital band. Rather, a large number of factors affect the likelihood of
success. These include:
• Launch point, launch timing, acceleration, and burnout speed
of the interceptor’s booster.
• Trajectory and altitude of the target.
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• Capabilities of the interceptor’s homing sensor(s).
• Whether the target is illuminated by the Sun and from what di-
rection.
• Whether the interceptor approaches the target from above and
views it against Earth, and whether the Earth is sunlit or not, or
whether the interceptor can approach from below, or horizon-
tally, and view the target against the blackness of space.
• The shape, temperature, emissivity, and reflectivity spectrum of
the target.
• Closing speed of the intercept, relative to the overall speed and
accuracy of the interceptor’s homing system.
Realistically, any operationalASATweapon or BMD needs to be
capable in as wide a range of circumstances as possible. For the vari-
ables that most strongly affect performance, the ranges within which
the system must perform well overlap broadly for ASAT and BMD
missions. The most stressing circumstances occur more often for the
BMD mission, so a thorough KE-BMD testing program will effec-
tively cover all testing requirements for KE-ASAT development and
perfection. Without ever testing against an actual orbital target, engi-
neers will be able to assure military and national leaders that a given
weapon system can be used against satellites with an effectiveness
determined by overall system reliability and not reduced by any un-
knowns due to the lack of testing against specifically orbital targets.
This is no more uncertain than whether US ballistic missiles can reach
targets in China on the basis of tests targeted at Kwajalein atoll.
ASAT-Only Test Bans
A Critique of Recent Proposals
In light of the equivalence of ASAT and BMD weapons and testing,
proposals to control one but not the other will not achieve effective
control of either. Nonetheless, US analysts often take it as given that
BMD testing cannot be restricted, and some argue that a narrow
KE-ASAT “test ban” would still be an effective and highly verifi-
able arms-control measure. For example, Bruce W. MacDonald has
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advocated “a ban on any space testing that creates significant debris.
. . . This option would seek to discourage the development of KE-
ASAT weapons by banning testing against orbiting objects. Care-
fully crafted language need not constrain missile defense testing”
(MacDonald 2009b, 7). Without addressing the arguments raised
here, MacDonald claims, “By banning suchASAT tests, states could
never have the level of confidence in such weapons that they would
probably need in order to rely upon them in a major conflict” (Mac-
Donald 2009a, 21).
From a technical perspective, this is almost certainly not true.
Testing against BM targets can provide enough information about the
performance and reliability of an interceptor under a wide range of
conditions that essentially no further information would be gained by
testing against an orbital object. At best, one may hope that political
decisionmakers would remain doubtful and therefore reluctant to
launch an escalating, preemptive, or surprise attack. But scientists
would be able to tell them that a thoroughly tested BMD system can
engage satellites within its reach, and for a mature system, they would
be able to confidently predict a high success rate.
Furthermore, Geoffrey Forden points out that a ban on impacts
only would allowASATweapon development to proceed on the basis
of “flyby” tests in which the interceptor is programmed to miss the
target by some distance vector that is small enough to be accurately
measured by telemetry from the interceptor’s own sensors (Forden
2007). Essentially, if the interceptor is able to pass through a desig-
nated point in relation to and close by the target, it could as well have
hit the target had it been instructed to do so. In order to frustrate this
testing mode, Forden proposes “to ban one spacecraft from ap-
proaching another orbiting spacecraft at excessive speeds,” suggest-
ing that “excessive speed” be defined as greater than 100 m/s closing
speed, and that the ban would apply when the “approaching” space-
craft was within 100 km of the orbiting spacecraft and using its
thrusters to guide the “approach.” One problem with this idea is that
it would appear to forbid spacecraft from using their thrusters at the
last moment to avoid a collision. Another is that it is not uncommon
for active satellites (and debris) in LEO to pass at less than a 100-km
distance, so the meaning of the term “approach” remains ambiguous.
But these issues could be resolved by further construction of the pro-
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posal. The deeper problem is that Forden’s proposal is intended to
permit continued BMD testing, since it only applies when at least one
of the objects is orbital, which, as we have seen, would render it tech-
nically ineffective.
A more sophisticated proposal from Ross Liemer and Christo-
pher Chyba points out that the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
has apparently already imposed upon itself an altitude ceiling as low
as 230 km for BMD intercept tests (Liemer and Chyba 2010, 156).As
seen in the USA-193 intercept, collisions at such low altitude do not
create long-lived debris even when one of the objects is actually or-
bital. For ICBM intercepts at higher altitudes, where the trajectory of
the ICBM is very close to orbital, nearly all of the debris will be
nonorbital and will quickly reenter, but some small amount of debris
may be boosted into orbital trajectories by the energy of the collision.
Therefore, to avoid any production of long-lived orbital debris, or
criticism for risking its production, MDA prefers to conduct inter-
cepts at low altitude.
Nothing is lost by adherence to this restriction. The GMD inter-
ceptors have burnout speed comparable to that of an ICBM. While a
typical combat engagement might take place at 700 km or greater al-
titude, faithful simulation of the conditions of such an intercept can be
achieved, if desired, by using energy management maneuvers such
as flying the rocket in a zigzag or spiral motion in order to waste some
of the booster’s speed (which would have otherwise gone into reach-
ing higher altitude).12 Similarly, tests at this low altitude also verify the
capability of the interceptors against satellites at the higher altitudes
that they are capable of reaching. In fact, an ASAT weapon with an
upper stage capable of reaching geosynchronous orbit (GEO) could
be fully tested with collisions only below 250 km and perhaps a few
nonintercept flights to GEO.
Liemer and Chyba suggest that an altitude limit of 250–300 km
for all collision tests, regardless of whether any orbital objects were
involved, would constitute a verifiable “limited test ban” comparable
in spirit to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the At-
mosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (known as the Limited
Test Ban Treaty). The primary impetus to that treaty was the world-
wide demand for an end to above-ground nuclear weapons tests,
which were adding significantly to the burden of radioactivity in the
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human environment. Similarly, Liemer and Chyba argue that their
“limited ban . . . would be both an arms control measure and an en-
vironmental measure to decrease debris collision risk for astronauts
and space systems” (Liemer and Chyba 2010, 154–155).
However, it is difficult to see the effectiveness of the “limited test
ban” as an arms-control measure since, as Liemer and Chyba admit,
it “would permit all countries to test debris-producingASAT systems
below the agreed altitude” (2010, 156). Moreover, as evidenced by the
2010 Chinese intercept test, following the storm of criticism China
endured in 2007, it seems unlikely that China, India, Russia, France,
or any other nation that wished to test a KE-ASAT in the near future
would choose to do so against an orbital object at high altitude.13 Un-
less it deliberately wished to demonstrate its readiness to use such a
weapon in spite of international opprobrium, it would more likely test
at low altitude either against a target on a BM-like trajectory or
against a target launched into a very low orbit just for the occasion.
Therefore it is not clear what would be achieved by formalizing the
present de facto moratorium as a treaty; ironically, doing so might le-
gitimize testing below the altitude limit, and thereby encourage the
development of KE-ASAT/BMD weapons by more and more states.
We might recall that the 1963 “test ban” did not slow nuclear weapons
testing and proliferation, but only moved it underground.14
Confidence Building and a Code of Conduct
While a low-altitude test limit for ASAT weapons and BMD might
be described as a confidence-building measure, a reasonable question
to ask is: confidence in what? Not that states do not possessASAT-ca-
pable weapons. Not that they are not testing and perfecting them. Not
that they would not consider their use under some circumstances. At
best, one can say that adherence to a low-altitude test limit would
avoid both the production of persistent space debris and the political
fallout of tests that produce it. But nations will likely adhere to such
a limit even without any treaty, while tests that demonstrate the de-
velopment, perfection, and possession of ASAT-capable weapons
would likely provoke reciprocal military responses whether they were
sanctioned by a treaty or not.
Another version of an ASAT test ban is incorporated into the
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Code of Conduct for Outer SpaceActivities, which has been proposed
by the Council of the European Union (EU). Conceived as “a set of
best practices aimed at ensuring security in outer space,” adherence
to the code is to be voluntary and undertaken by the subscribing states
without obligation or prescribed penalties for noncompliance. Ac-
cordingly, the council-approved draft of the code from December
2008 calls on subscribing states to “refrain from any intentional ac-
tion which will or might bring about, directly or indirectly, the dam-
age or destruction of outer-space objects unless such action is
conducted to reduce the creation of outer-space debris and/or justi-
fied by imperative safety considerations” (Council of the European
Union 2008). With the understanding, rooted in existing space law,15
that “outer space objects” include satellites (on orbital trajectories)
but not ballistic missiles (on nonorbital trajectories), this language
may be taken to proscribe the use of any weapon as a KE-ASAT, un-
less such an action is “justified by imperative safety considerations.”16
The 2008 draft, adopted following the USA-193 shot, seems to ac-
knowledge and approve of the given justification for that action. How-
ever, in order to be able to damage or destroy an outer-space object
when justified by imperative safety considerations, a Subscribing
State would need to possess the appropriate means of doing so. Thus,
even if the code can be read as restricting the testing and use ofASAT-
capable weapons, it clearly does not ban their development or pos-
session, or their testing against non–outer space objects, which as we
have seen is sufficient for their perfection as weapons against outer-
space objects.
The October 2010 revision of the EU draft Code of Conduct goes
further, revising the paragraph quoted above to read
refrain from any action which intends to bring about, directly or in-
directly, damage, or destruction, of outer space objects unless such
action is conducted to reduce the creation of outer space debris
and/or is justified by the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence in accordance with the United Nations Charter or im-
perative safety considerations. (Council of the European Union
2010; emphasis added)
This language would appear to legitimize not only the develop-
ment and possession even of destructiveASATweapons, but also their
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use, not only when justified by “imperative safety considerations” but
also when “justified by the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence”—that is, in warfare.17 Thus, the code can no longer be
seen as even an ineffective arms control measure; its only function is
to ask that subscribing states test theirASATweapons in a non–debris
creating way, while their use in “individual or collective self-defence”
is explicitly allowed, overriding even concerns about debris creation.
While the Obama administration has indicated it is considering
adoption of the code or a similar measure, there appears to be no
prospect that the administration will do so prior to the presidential
election in November 2012.18 Meanwhile, China has expressed no
great enthusiasm for the code.19 As we have seen, the code would do
little or nothing to slow or stop the development and acquisition of
ASAT weapons and other space weapons; it would at best dampen
perceptions of an arms race, and hopefully encourage further coop-
erative measures.
What Can Be Done?
Amore substantive measure, which could be taken bilaterally by the
United States and China, would be a voluntary moratorium by both
nations on all intentional collisions of objects above the atmosphere.20
This would be in effect a moratorium on both BMD andASAT-mode
tests. Like proposed ASAT-only test bans, it would be highly verifi-
able by national technical means. Unlike an ASAT-only moratorium,
it would have real meaning in terms of arms control, because it would
prevent the full validation of any completely new KE-BMD/ASAT
weapons while permitting the continued development, reliability, and
performance enhancement of existing systems possessed by both
sides. It would thus disproportionately impact calculations about po-
tential offensive uses of such weapons both asASATweapons and as
a BMD “shield” behind which to hide when executing an offensive
first strike, while having less impact on the ability of BMD to com-
plicate the calculations of potential aggressors contemplating the of-
fensive use of ballistic missiles.
The suggestion of an exoatmospheric collision test ban emerged
in discussions between US and Chinese participants in the Honolulu
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workshop in April 2011. Either side could propose the initiative, and
the other side could embrace it without formal commitment. It would
serve as a clear pause in the nascent US-China space arms race, and
assuming it were sustained, it could later be formalized and globalized
either as a stand-alone arms-control agreement or as part of a com-
prehensive space security convention.
At first glance, the idea of stopping all collision tests of BMD in-
terceptors is likely to be seen by US analysts as a nonstarter. But
ironically, critics of BMD have traditionally demanded more and
more rigorous testing, while MDA and its predecessor, the Strategic
Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), have been loath to comply.
This may, in fact, reflect the priorities of a rational development pro-
gram. BMD tests are expensive, costing in the range of $100–$200
million each. It is not clear that technical progress is strongly tied to
a heavy schedule of intercept tests involving actual collisions. Crit-
ics have asked why tests have not been operationally realistic or in-
volved simple, known countermeasures that adversaries could easily
use to defeat BMD. For example, the attacking missile may dispense
a large number of aluminized mylar balloons, all slightly different,
one of which contains the warhead. This simple shell game is likely
to defeat the radar, infrared, and optical sensors used by US BMD
systems, because the balloons would be opaque to these forms of ra-
diation.
Supporters have maintained that basic capabilities, such as “hit-
ting a bullet with a bullet,” must be developed and perfected first,
and that the capability to discriminate warheads from decoys, and to
defeat other CMs, can be added later. However, the capability of US
BMD systems, such as the GMD and SM-3, to hit target missiles
that are not protected by CMs has already been demonstrated in
dozens of tests. The more difficult problems of decoy discrimina-
tion and the defeat of other CMs can be fully addressed, if at all,
without collision testing, since here the task is simply to identify the
correct target, and test analysts will have the benefit of knowing the
answer. Between tests, a lot of work is done to analyze results, re-
move bugs, and try to ensure that the same failure is not repeated.
Failures due to malfunction of components rather than overall poor
system performance are common. Such failures are embarrassing
and undermine whatever deterrent value the BMD systems may
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have, while the problems that cause them could often be detected
just as well in noncollision tests.
In fact, many tests are conducted without the intent to complete
an intercept. Thrusters and kill-vehicle systems are often assessed in
terrestrial “hover tests” and in flight tests without actual targets. As
noted previously, BMD/ASAT systems can also be tested in “close
flyby” mode, and such tests can not only be fully effective in reveal-
ing the hidden design flaws, software bugs, and component manu-
facturing defects that are the most common causes of failure, but can
also provide, to essentially the same level of precision as tests ending
in collisions, the sensor and guidance accuracy and overall system
performance data needed to enable progressive improvement. Given
that the United States has several fairly mature KE-BMD systems that
have been tested in dozens of intercepts, a moratorium on collisions
would freeze a US advantage, while allowing both nations to con-
tinue refinement of their existing designs.
Even with completely unrestricted testing, BMD cannot be relied
on to be highly effective, due to uncertainties in how the threat mis-
siles will be used; whether unknown, or known but effective CMs
will be employed; and whether all essential components of the BMD
system will be operational when needed, or whether some will be un-
dergoing maintenance or will have been degraded by hostile action.
The history of rocketry and complex weapons in general suggests that
for a mature system, with good quality control, perhaps as much as 90
percent effectiveness would be possible against plain targets in ideal
conditions. However, performance will likely degrade in combat.
Against realistic threats employing even simple, known CMs, the
BMD is likely to prove completely ineffective.
Therefore, there are two realistic objectives for BMD. The first is
to provide some level of attrition against cheap conventional missiles
without countermeasures. Weapons for this purpose already exist,
and, as we have seen, they can continue to be improved without col-
lision testing. The second objective is to strengthen deterrence of any
attempt to use a small number of rudimentary missiles, perhaps with
nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads, as weapons of terror and
blackmail. Here the thinking is that adversaries may view the pos-
session of such missiles as a trump card, enabling them to engage in
regional aggression while deterring intervention by a major power.
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They are less likely to do so if the major power acts as if it will not
be deterred, and particularly if it creates the impression that there is
a significant chance that the missiles would be intercepted or that it
believes the missiles would be intercepted. Continual testing of
already-proven hit-to-kill capabilities is not needed in order to have
this effect, nor is a high certainty of BMD effectiveness—which is
not achievable in any case. Rather, testing that openly displays the
unreliability of BMD, or which advertises the fact that successful dis-
crimination of warheads from simple decoys has not been demon-
strated, undermines the value of BMD to discourage adversary
strategies that rely on BMs as deterrents. BMD supporters might
therefore be willing to accept a moratorium on collision tests, partic-
ularly in light of the fact that failure of such tests is hard to conceal.
Conclusion
Different levels of confidence in weapons performance are needed
for aggressive and nonaggressive purposes. Aggressive use of KE-
ASATs, or weapons developed as BMD but having ASAT capability,
requires high confidence in their ability to achieve a prompt knock-
out; otherwise a preemptive or surprise attack plan may go awry, with
potentially disastrous consequences for the attacker. While collision
testing against BM targets can provide high confidence in a weapon’s
effectiveness as anASATweapon, tests that do not involve actual col-
lisions will leave greater room for doubt.
Similarly, aggressive plans that involve launching a preemptive
strike while relying on BMD to stop any retaliation demand high con-
fidence in the effectiveness of the BMD. However, particularly if its
capabilities are unknown, BMDmay complicate the calculations of an
attacker without the defender needing to have high confidence that
the system will function well, as long as the attacker must consider
that it might work to some degree. In fact, if testing is confined to fly-
bys and other noncollision forms of testing, the defense can better
conceal system performance and any progress that has been made in
the defeat of countermeasures. From this perspective, BMD may be
expected to “work better” under a total ban on exoatmospheric colli-
sion tests.
636 Chinese and US Space Weapons and Arms Control
A reciprocal moratorium by the United States and China, and to
be joined by other nations, on all collision tests above the atmosphere
would thus offer real stability. It would pose an obstacle to the de-
velopment by either nation of completely new KE-BMD/ASAT sys-
tems or the proliferation of such weapons to other nations. And it
would erode the confidence required to plan aggressive uses of such
weapons. Such a moratorium would at the same time avoid under-
mining the limited deterrent value of BMD, and would not prevent the
further refinement of existing BMD systems by means of noncollision
testing.
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1. FY-1C was near-polar in inclination, so that the debris fills the entire
sphere. However, the threat to other satellites in LEO would be just as great from
the destruction of a low-inclination satellite, for which the debris would remain
concentrated within a low-latitude band through which all satellites must pass
twice per orbit.
2. Various sources report, and the leaked US cable of January 12, 2010, con-
firms, that the 2007 test may have been preceded by two or three flight tests that
were either unsuccessful or had been planned as “fly-bys” to assess system per-
formance.
3. The target missile is described in the cable as a “medium range ballistic
missile,” that is, a missile with a maximum range between 1,000 and 3,000 km.
However, other sources report that CSS-X-11 is a North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization designator for a missile with a maximum range of about 250–300 km
with a 500 kg warhead. See, for example, Jane’s Information Group 2011 and
Globalsecurity.org (undated).
4. Public sources locate Shuangchengzi in north central China, and Korla
about 1,200 km to the west-northwest. A US official had identified the 2007
ASAT interceptor as an SC-19 shortly after that test; see Clinton 2007.
5. Including five since the second Chinese test; see Missile Defense Advo-
cacy Alliance 2011.
6. The term “direct ascent” refers to the fact that a KE-ASAT need not be
inserted into orbit but may simply ascend to a point in space (and time) where
the target will collide with it.
7. Indeed, US officials publicly voiced doubts that the test was intended for
BMD purposes. According to one report, “Under Secretary of State for Arms
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Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher was careful to note the Jan. 11
test was a ballistic missile defense test only in Beijing’s portrayal of the event.
‘They have asserted that this was a ballistic missile defense test,’Tauscher said.
When asked by a reporter whether U.S. officials have doubts about the assertion,
she replied, ‘We’re still looking at that’” (Inside Defense 2010).
8. Reentry would have torn loose the plumbing connections to the tank, and
hydrazine, which undergoes exothermic decomposition at moderate tempera-
tures, would have melted and burned where it exited the plumbing and any other
ruptures. However, a crude modeling study commissioned by NASA found that
reentry heating alone would not have completely ablated the titanium tank. In-
dependent analysts, who obtained the NASA study through a Freedom of Infor-
mationAct request, unfortunately misread the paper and concluded that its results
actually indicated that complete ablation was likely. Much of the ensuing con-
troversy missed the point that even if the tank might have landed fully intact, it
posed little risk to human life (Butt 2008; Oberg 2009).
9. The satellite orbit covered a band between 58.5° North and South latitude,
totaling 435 million km2, within which nearly all the world’s population of 6.7
billion lived, so that the average population density below the satellite’s orbit
was about 15/km2. The area of a seven-meter radius circle is 0.00015 km2. The
product of these numbers yields an expectation of roughly 0.002 persons killed.
However, people do not distribute randomly, but are usually clustered together,
and it is not unlikely that on average two or more persons are found within any
seven-meter radius circle that contains at least one person. Furthermore, seven
meters is likely an overestimate of the lethal radius. Therefore the chance of any
fatality, assuming the tank landed intact and loaded with hydrazine,was no more
than about 1 in 1,000.
10. Many commentators speculated that another possible motive for the op-
eration was to prevent classified technology from falling into foreign hands, but
it is doubtful that very much of strategic importance could have been learned
from the scattered and charred remains that might have made it to some area of
Earth that was unlikely to be the territory of a strategic adversary of the United
States.
11. Another factor is that ballistic missiles can be equipped with counter-
measures (CM) to defeat BMD, which would be impractical for satellites to use,
and which, in any case, they are not equipped with (whereas BMs, being on the
ground, can always be refitted with new CMs to frustrate any BMD). See Sessler
et al. 2000.
12. Burnout speed is the speed a rocket will have accelerated to when it has
depleted its fuel. To be unambiguous, its definition must neglect losses due to air
resistance and climbing against gravity. But it is often treated more casually, and
such losses, for typical flight profiles, may be included in quoted values.
13. For India, see Samson 2011; for France, see Svitak 2011.
14. See, for example, the graph of “Worldwide Nuclear Testing, 1945–1998”
posted at Wikipedia 2011.
15. The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial
Bodies, known as the Outer Space Treaty, mandates that “States Parties to the
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Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nu-
clear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other
manner.” This has never been understood to constitute a ban on nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles.
16. It is difficult to imagine any circumstances in which the use of a KE-
ASAT could reduce the creation of outer-space debris, but other forms of “dam-
age or destruction of outer space objects” might.
17. In theory, such use would have to be limited to wars waged in self-
defense “in accordance with the United Nations Charter”; otherwise, under the
Charter, the United Nations would be prone to take action against the state wag-
ing aggressive war. However, the author is not aware of any recent wars in which
all belligerent parties did not maintain that their actions, however aggressive,
were justified by the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in ac-
cordance with the UN Charter.
18. This is the author’s interpretation of confidential statements made by an
administration official, as well as reading of the political situation with respect to
code adoption. As of July 2011, no decision has been announced, the Pentagon
had not completed its review of the code, and conservative lawmakers and pol-
icy analysts had staked out a position in opposition to it (Lake 2011; Kueter 2011).
19. Official Chinese statements about the idea of a Code of Conduct are hard
to locate, and China has not responded to the EU draft, while US officials have
repeatedly expressed a favorable disposition toward it. Chinese participants in the
Honolulu workshop confirmed that the code is generally viewed in China as in-
adequate and an attempt to deflect China’s proposal of a treaty banning the place-
ment of weapons in space. In other forums, Chinese analysts and officials have
expressed the view that China would not want to be isolated and would proba-
bly join the code if a majority of spacefaring nations did likewise.
20. “Above the atmosphere” can be defined arbitrarily as any altitude greater
than 100 km, or somewhat less arbitrarily as 85 km, the upper limit of the meso-
sphere, in which reentering objects burn.
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